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DDAS Accident Report 
 
Accident details 
Report date: 19/05/2006 Accident number: 379 
Accident time: 14:00 Accident Date: 13/06/2002 
Where it occurred: M/F 505, Bal'awin, 
Bayt Yahun 
Country: Lebanon 
Primary cause: Inadequate training (?) Secondary cause: Management/control 
inadequacy (?) 
Class: Demolition accident Date of main report: 17/07/2002 
ID original source: BOI:No004/2002 Name of source: MACC SL 
Organisation: Name removed  
Mine/device: No.4 Israel AP blast / 
frag 
Ground condition: bushes/scrub 
grass/grazing area 
rocks/stones 
Date record created: 22/02/2004 Date  last modified: 23/03/2004 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 1 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system:  Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale:  M/F 505 Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
inadequate investigation (?) 
mine/device found in "cleared" area (?) 
incomplete detonation (?) 
inadequate training (?) 
 
Accident report 
A summarised MACC BOI report was made available in 2003. It is reproduced below, edited 
for anonymity. The commercial demining company involved was asked to supply the internal 
report referenced in this document in March 2003.  
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 Introduction 
1. At the time of the accident a Manual Clearance Team were operational on M/F 505 
clearance site, at Bal’awin, Bayt Yahun. The Manual Clearance Team  had been operational 
on M/F 505 since the 24th May 2002. A total of 1 x breaching lane (base lane), 2 x exploration 
lanes and the main clearance lanes had been cut into M/F 505 during the previous 17 x days 
clearance activities, resulting in the location of the minefield mine rows, as per the M/F 
records. 
2.  Prior to the accident all demining operations had actually ceased and the Team were in 
the process of destroying the days located mines and UXO (63 x Israeli No.4 Anti-Personnel 
mines, 2 x 60mm Mortar Bomb and 1 x 52mm Mortar Bomb). The Team Leader had prepared 
the explosive charges using approximately 2oz of Gelatine Explosives for each mine, all 
linked with a detonating cord “Main Line”; the Gelatine Explosive being directly compressed 
on to the Detonating Cord with no “Branch Lines” being used. For the first demolition serial, a 
total number of 32 Israeli No.4 Anti-Personnel mines were prepared.  
3. At approximately 13:43 hours, the signal “Fire in the Hole” was passed from the Team to 
[commercial demining group] base location and the demolition serial was conducted. 
Following a short time period, to allow the debris to stop falling and the smoke to dissipate the 
Team Leader moved forward alone to check for complete detonation of the serial, 
systematically checking each crater in turn. 
4.  At approximately 14:00, hrs an uncontrolled detonation in a previously cleared area 
occurred, whilst the Team Leader was checking the area. Initially the Team Leader thought 
that the uncontrolled detonation was a rifle shot, as local hunters had been operating the 
general area. He then felt a pain in his buttocks and on investigation found that his buttocks 
were bleeding. He then made his way out of the minefield to the Command Post where his 
injuries were treated by Team Medic.  
 
Medical details 
5. The Team Leader suffered bruising and minor abrasions to both buttocks. Treatment was 
conducted on-site and at [commercial demining group] base location. The Team Leader was 
also taken to Bint Jubayl hospital for an Anti-Tetanus injection. 
 
Conclusions 
6. Based on the investigation, the statements and visits to the site, the BOI concludes the 
following: 
• There was a surface uncontrolled detonation of an Israeli No.4 Anti Personnel mine 
Igniter, the Igniter detonated after the Team Leader inadvertently stood on it.  
• Prior to the uncontrolled detonation of the Israeli No.4 Anti Personnel mine Igniter, 
during the demolition serial there was a partial detonation of the Israeli No.4 Anti 
Personnel mine. Evidence shows that the crater was relatively shallow, no lifting had 
formed around the edges and a large quantity of the mine body and mine explosives 
were recovered by the BOI. 
• The reasons for the partial detonation are: 
• The Gelatine explosive (Nitro-Glycerine based) has a high “Brisance” 
(Shattering effect), this being ideal for quarrying applications but not ideal 
when the transfer of the detonation wave from a donor charge to a mine / 
UXO is required. 
• Using a single piece of detonating cord to try and ensure that the detonating 
wave is transferred to any donor charge is insufficient; it simply lacks the 
secondary high explosive concentrated enhancement, that is required to 
ensure the wave transfer. 
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• The 2 oz Gelatine donor explosive charge used is insufficient to ensure that 
the detonating wave is transferred to an explosive charge in a mine (the 
detonating pressure of Gelatine is less than half of PE4).  
• The bruising and abrasions to the Team Leader’s buttocks was due to both primary 
and secondary fragmentation resulting from the part disintegration of the Israeli No.4 
mine Igniter, on the detonation of the primary high explosive fill.  
• The post-accident marking of the accident site was carried out in accordance with 
current SOPs. 
• The passage of information in between the accident site, [commercial demining 
group] base location and the MACC SL was very good, with all relevant information 
being passed in a timely manner. 
• The BOI agrees and accepts [commercial demining group] Accident and IMSMA 
Reports. 
• The number of mines cleared by Team No 4 to date by far exceeds the number of 
mines as reported on the IF record and MACC SL Minefield Report.  M/F 505 may not 
actually be the correct designation of this minefield. 
 
Recommendations 
7. The following are recommendations based on the BOI conclusions: 
• When using detonating cord as an intermediary charge and prior to it being placed in 
the main explosive charge, 300mm should be folded back and a double knot be tied 
at the end. This concentration of PETN will ensure that the detonating wave is 
transferred to the main explosive charge. The main explosive charge should be 
broken down into 1/3 and 2/3 segments, the knotted detonating cord should then be 
placed into the 2/3 segment and then the 1/3 segment compressed on top. In order to 
ensure that the majority of the detonating wave is directed towards the mine, the 2/3 
segment should be placed as close to the mine (see overleaf). If TNT blocks are 
being used then a minimum of 4 x detonating cord turns around the block should be 
used in order to ensure the transfer of the detonating wave. 
• [Crude computer sketch deleted.] 
• “Branch Lines” should be used, when conducting demolitions using either the “Main 
Line” or “Ring Main” detonating cord principles. 
• Main Line junctions should be made with a clove hitch, detonator clip or 100mm 
intimate tape contact. 
• [Crude computer sketch deleted.] 
• Note that the same principle is applied to “Ring Mains”, whether they be outer or inner 
“Ring Mains”. 
• During the post-demolition serial check, Team Leaders are to check each and every 
seat of detonation systematically at a safe distance, should doubt exist that there has 
not been a complete detonation then the immediate area should be systematically 
cleared using normal manual clearance drills. 
• Amendments be made to [commercial demining group] SOPs to include the above 3 
x recommendations. 
• No further issues of the Gelatine explosives be made, until further notice.  
• No amendments are necessary to the National TSG’s for Mine/UXO Clearance. 
• The conclusions detailed in this report be distributed and discussed among all 
[commercial demining group] Operational Field Staff. 
• MACC SL to investigate the correct M/F designator. 
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Signed: QA Officer, Mine Action Co-ordination Centre Southern Lebanon 
  
Victim Report 
Victim number: 496 Name: Name removed 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: supervisory  Fit for work: yes 
Compensation: Not made available 
(insured HMT) 
Time to hospital: not recorded 
Protection issued: Not recorded Protection used: not recorded 
 




No medical report was made available. 
 
Analysis 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as “Inadequate training” because the Victim 
prepared a demolition in a manner that was unlikely to be successful. The Victim was a Team 
Leader and seems to have been inadequately prepared for his tasks, so the secondary cause 
is listed as a “Management/control inadequacy”.   
The accident report is noted as “inadequate” because the “summarised” report does not 
include sufficient detail in critical areas. It is possible that the full report would correct these 
failings. The summarised report does not record the time taken for the Victim to receive 
hospital treatment or what PPE was being worn. The report does not specify the fuze type 
found on other mines in the area, so identifying which type of No.4 fuze was likely to have 
been involved in the accident. Further, the report does not include the demining group’s 
internal report or witness statements which can help when wanting to later assess and 
confirm the chain of events. 
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